doi: 10.18178/ijssh.2024.14.3.1207
The Compatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility
Kaiwen Yang
- Lower Canada College, Avenue Royal, Montréal (Québec), Canada
- Manuscript received September 7, 2023
- revised October 7, 2023
- accepted March 1, 2024
- published June 27, 2024
Abstract
Compatibilism arises as a potential bridge between determinism and moral responsibility, suggesting that causal determinism doesn’t necessarily negate free will or moral culpability. Proponents of compatibilism redefine free will, focusing on the alignment of actions with internal desires and values rather than the existence of alternative options. Thus, individuals can be morally responsible even within a deterministic framework if their actions reflect their genuine motivations and are not externally coerced. This nuanced understanding emphasizes the authenticity of an agent’s intentions rather than the availability of choices. This perspective extends beyond philosophical discourse, impacting ethical frameworks and decision-making processes. Accepting determinism challenges traditional notions of blame, shifting focus towards systemic factors and fostering a more compassionate approach. By acknowledging the complex interplay of internal motivations and external influences, society may evolve towards a more empathetic understanding of moral responsibility and decision-making.
Keywords
- determinism
- moral responsibility
- compatibility
How to Cite
Kaiwen Yang, "The Compatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility," International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 145-149, 2024. https://doi.org/ 10.18178/ijssh.2024.14.3.1207
Copyright & License
Copyright © 2024 by the authors. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).