Security Governance: An Alternative Paradigm?

Danzi Liao

Abstract—**For the past ten years,** *governance* **has been increasingly deemed as a superior framework of explaining the changing structure in the fields of public administration and security management.** *Security governance* **is therefore suggested as an alternative theoretical** *paradigm* **for looking at national, regional, and global security practices. This paper takes Chinese civil protection as a case to examine how security governance perspective is applied as both an analytical framework and an empirical model for Chinese security policies. Nevertheless, the inefficiency of inter-organizational cooperation and lack of accountability of sectors involved in the process of Chinese civil protection imply that the security governance framework is not without problems. This study concludes from its examination that the security governance framework is very good at explaining the changing collective action and security policy making. Nevertheless, it is not to replace or abandon the** *security government* **framework, which remains central to the current security practices.**

Index Terms—**Security governance, civil protection, public administration, civil protection, non-traditional security.**

I. INTRODUCTION: FROM SECURITY GOVERNMENT TO SECURITY GOVERNANCE

Since the World Bank initiated "crisis in governance" in 1989, there has emerged a widely universal appearance of the term "governance" particularly in international areas and language. "Governance and development" was taken as the theme of the World Bank's 1992 report, "governance in project evaluation" was applied by organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD) in 1986, and "governance" was set up as a special column of the *International Social Science Journal* in 1998. To a large extent, it is now an axiomatic usage of the term *governance* in such contexts as "community governance", "security governance", "corporate governance", and environmental governance. On the other hand, no definitions of *governance* have thus far been agreed upon in academic or policy discourse, despite the fact that various explanations, analysis, and interpretation have been proposed since its inception, In scholarly use, the key components of *governance* generally include decentralization, interaction, cooperation, multi-actor participation, mutual dialogue and negotiation [1].What's more important, *governance*is implicitly taken to directly represent "good government" and "effective governing".

As a newly emerged analytical perspective of explaining the remarkable development in multi-actor integration, inter-organizational cooperation and non-governmental engagement in the past decade in public administration and security management, governance is presented as a transformation of analytical *paradigm* from *government* to

governance [1]. Generally, governance differs from government in such aspects as hierarchical structure, fiat or negotiation, and government dominated or multi-actors involved. It is currently a common view that although there is no explicit boundary between *government* and *governance* in the fields of public administration, crisis management, social development, and international security, the theory of the former fails to explain the newly emerging forms of organization and impressive new public practices while the latter shows a strong capacity to take full account of the changing security challenges and the rapid rise of trans-organizational networks. The consequences of this shift from government to governance are also reflected in the domain of security studies. It is suggested that part of the shift of transatlantic security policy from a state-centered bias and two central polarities towards complicated networks of state and non-state actors could be recognized as an emerging shift from *security government* to *security governance*. There also have been diverse theoretical and empirical findings showing that a transformation of *security government* to *security governance* is emerging as an alternative framework (or "paradigm") to address the security problems from the global to the regional and individual levels, and from traditional military security to the newly rising non-military security management. On the whole, the philosophy and applicability of *security governance* were noticeably examined in the formation of regional and subregional security regimes, typically including europe union (EU), association of south eastern nations (ASEAN), north america treaty organization (NATO), and Asian-Pacific cooperation institutions [2]-[4].There have been increased concerns on the part of researchers and practitioners in many fields regarding analytical utility and practical application of *security governance.*

To simplify, security governance is the application of governance theory in security studies. *Security* which was originally equivalent to the traditional *military security* has been an attractive topic to observers of diverse fields, with its agenda gaining a widening and deepening process since the late 1970s to 1980s when it started to embrace the *non-military* factors. After several rounds of discussion and redefinition of the term *security,* security now refers not only to those security issues in the military domain but also to those in non-military fields, stretching towards a much more encompassing concept [5].Based on the theoretical discussion and empirical observation of *security* and *governance*, this paper briefly defines *security governance* as a process during which security capacity can be strengthened through an 'effective governing' mechanism.

The purpose of this paper is to take Chinese civil protection (CP) as a case of security governance to provide an overview of how security governance is applied in Chinese security policy making and what problems this framework might be associated with in actual security

practices. Through this case study, it also attempts to accommodate security governance theory to the Chinese specific context and examine what modification this analytical framework needs to make. Finally this paper argues that security governance is not an alternative *paradigm* to replace or abandon the security government framework, which in many essential aspects help *security governance* set up the necessary rules and regulations and therefore remain a central paradigm to better explain what is happening nowadays in security policy.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Part of the transformation of security policy from its state-centered bias and two central multilateral organizations (NATO-North atlantic treaty organization and OSCE-organization for security and co-operation in europe) towards complex networks of state and non-state actors can be understood in terms of an emerging shift from *security government* to *security governance*[2][3].On the whole, security governance is enforced by the occurrence of non-military security issues in widespread areas and facilitated by the rapid expansion of the power of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), third party departments, private actors, and even individuals. Security governance is combined with two components: security and governance. Before introducing security governance as a whole, it is needed first of all to streamline the development of "security" and "governance" respectively to fully grasp the developmental background of security governance and its analytical utility.

The delineation of security is largely complicated by the fact that as super power relations change and academicians self-define its boundary by their own views, we get very different perspectives on what falls in and what does not in the concept of security. As to the normative connotation, wolfers [6] proposed that "security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked", "it was never possible to measure security 'objectively' in that subjective evaluations played an inevitable part in states' assessments". Nevertheless, security is, argues the copenhagen school, a speech act and "by saying 'security', a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development"[7], [8]. This study suggests that security is in essence three dimensional - objective (whether a real threat exists), subjective (whether and how the threat is reflected or interpreted by specific group and actor), and also inter-subjective (what the threat represents and how the threat is understood by all the actors involved). Ideally, security is therefore such a status that there is no existence of objective threat, no subjective fear felt, and no inter-subjective misunderstanding or misperception.

It has long been established that security is naturally equivalent to *national security*, which without doubt embraces military defense, strategy security and survival in war. It is also commonly noted that this is what "traditional security" implies. After the Second World War, the unease with traditional security thinking has expressed itself in a frequent call for a 'broadening' or 'updating' of the concept of security [9]. The meaning of security was then subsequently widely debated, as a large scale of cross-state military confrontations of traditional form could be obviously avoided. At the central debate was whether and how to widen and deepen the security concept from military sector to non-military sector and from state level up to global level and down to individual level. Meanwhile, such non-traditional (broadly non-military) threats as economic crisis, environmental degradation, food safety, illegal immigrant, religious conflict, and natural disaster are being *securitized* as "*non-traditional security*" issues. Non-traditional security (NTS) departs from military, political, and diplomatic affairs, in that it refers to non-military factors that compose a threat to the existence and development of sovereign states and the whole of mankind [10].Security is then changing into a much encompassing concept. Security governance is then taken as a new perspective of analyzing NTS challenges and also providing alternative ways for dealing with NTS issues, implying a differentiation in the public security policy making.

The shift from traditional security to NTS can be more explicitly indicated by how Asian actors add prefix before "security" to embrace those much "non-traditional" security issues (see TABLE I).

TABLE I: ASIA'S CHANGING SECURITY DISCOURSE (1950S-2000S)

Concept	Main National, Institutional and Epistemic Advocates in Asia
National Security (1950s)	USA, SEATO[a], Five Power Defence Arrangements
Comprehensive Security (1960s)	Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, ASEAN, ASEAN-ISIS[b]
Common/ Cooperative Security (1970s/1980s)	ARF[c], CSCAP[d]
Non-Traditional Security (1990s-2000s)	China, ASEAN Plus Three, SEATO
Human Security (1990s-2000s)	Japan, Thailand (pre-Thaksin Shinawatra), ASEAN Secretariat(since Surin Pitsuwan)

Source: Acharya, A. (2009) "Traditional, non-traditional and human security: relevance and implications for China in the 21st century," Paper presented at the conference on the nexus between traditional and non-traditional security dynamic: Chinese experiences meet global challenges, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China, 18-20September.

Note:[a] South-east asia treaty organization; [b] Institute of strategic and international studies; [c] ASEAN regional forum; [d]Council for security cooperation in the asia pacific;

The debate and argumentation on the term *governance* might be even greater than those on security. In terms of governance, elke krahmann [2] stated that it is the degradation of authority and the outsourcing of public policy functions that transatlantic governments had accumulated over the past decades which require a new discourse (governance). For well over two millennia, the notion of governance has been applied to characterize the institutions, regimes, and practices of governing [11]. As the popularity of the *governance* is growing, clarifying its meaning is of greater significance. Etymologically, the word "governance" and its cognates were rooted in the Greek term "kybernan", meaning "to steer or pilot a ship", implying to a large extent the direction of moving ahead under control, fiat or negotiation. By implication, the term and practice of governance might overall embrace such features as empowerment, transparency, adaptability,

conflict resolution, consultation and cooperation, distribution of power, and rule of law[12], [13].Arrayed across the spectrum of objects and principles associated with *governance* are diverse types of perspectives, views, and definitions. Some researchers hold that under the framework of governance, the locus of public administration has been moving away from exclusively top-down government toward the "new public" governance [14], or so called "hollow state"[15], [16], or a "third party" government [17]. Lynn [18] concluded and evaluated the most prominent five meanings or models of *governance*: third-party government, governance as networks, governance-not-government, multilevel governance, and the new governance. Despite of all the above perspectives and definitions, krahmann [2] suggested a more restrictive definition of the term *governance* as follows:

Governance denotes the structures and processes which enable a set of public and private actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political authority.

This paper summarizes the governance paradigm features "new government" and "the changing locus of public authority" which involves three elements: (i) an expanding role for non-governmental actors (broadly civil society) in public management, possibly displacing government, and, in many accounts, (ii) greater reliance on deliberative, as opposed to representative, forms of democratic participation, and (iii) the relationship and boundary of binaries of public/private, formal/informal, fiat/consensus, and authorative/un-authorative are redrawn. Governance is more than a term or notion; it is a new governing structure through which governing is processed by inter-sectoral ways. The condition of ordered rule is executed by fiat and consultancy, society is not controlled but governed by its own way. While many researchers put their focus on what governance is, it is also worthwhile to point out what governance is not. Governance, according to many researchers, is neither to question or deny the central role of state in public administration or national security, nor to abandon the formal institutions and rules necessary for the overall order.

Next, this paper addresses *security governance*, which was first proposed by Krahmann [2]in examining the shift of security policies in Europe and North America. Although it is obviously difficult to specify which or how many dimensions have to be fragmented for a policy-making structure to qualify as *governance* rather than *government*, several dimensions clearly show that a new system of security governance might be emerging in transatlantic area, namely geographical dimension, functional dimension, distribution of resources, interest dimension, normative dimension, decision-making, and policy implementation [2], [3]. Krahmann [2] stated that the complexities reflected by these dimensions cannot be fully grasped by the concept of security regime, security community or multi-polarity, but *security governance*.

According to mark weber *et al.*[4],'security governance' comprises five features: hierarchy; the interaction of a large number of both public and private actors; both formal and informal institutionalization; relations between actors that are ideational in character, structured by norms and understandings as much as by formal regulations; and, finally, collective purpose. For the purpose of this paper, it tentatively cites Weber's interpretation as the normative view on security governance:

Security governance is involving the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes[4].

By this logic, security governance increasingly encompasses multi-dimensional indirect relationships with plural and dispersed societal entities. This perspective distinctly contrasts with the traditional view of security government as encompassing the supervision of central authority which is built upon by hierarchical positions and regulated principles. Based on the proceding analysis, this paper identified six dimensions of *security governance*.

(i) Actor. Both public and private, governmental organizations (GOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and national, regional and global organizations properly participate into public management process and assume consequent responsibilities. Privatization and out-sourcing of public management issues are encouraged in a proper range.

(ii) Direction. Orders of authority are distributed in (remove "both" it's 3 orders) top-down, bottom-up and horizontal manner. The traditional top-down administrative line should be changed. The bottom-up approach is a good source of information feedback and horizontal interaction is integral to inter-organizational communication and security sector reform. Bottom-up and horizontal manner requires a term of art which seems more fitting than the more bureaucratic and categorical government.

(iii) Channel. Obedience by authority and hierarchical power is now surpassed by mutual trust, joint vision and negotiation. More efficient security management is realized through a well-agreed goal. This is required under the information age in which information and knowledge come along from multiple directions and the mode of information transfer is becoming more diversified. Those who have easier availability of information would have proper channel to share and disperse it. Only under the condition of mutual trust and joint vision can the utility of information be maxized.

(iv) Form. Flexible and soft elements are brought into current management style. The traditional strict and formal orders are replaced with inter-personal negotiation and discussion. The established convention that it is top head's responsibility to make decisions of every kind is replaced by multilateral discussions and staff meetings. Compared with the traditional "government" type, governance relies more on cultural identity and mental dispositon. Self motivation and organizational learning exerts a more influencing role in improving organizational performance.

(v) Model. Security governance has more than one model. It is context-specific. To what extent and in what level that security governance could be adopted and applied largely depends on the key factors of that context, such as human

resources, legal environment, and the development of civil society. This point could be confirmed by respective empirical studies in EU, South American, and Asia-Pacific.

(vi) Scope. Security governance can simultaneously find its empirical cases in the national, regional and global range. What needs to be stressed is that each dimension might take a variety of forms and different extents along a range of this theoretically constructed framework.

The framework of security governance is being widely applied in different fields and analytical levels. It is adopted as a helpful framework for examining the interactions between a diverse number of actors and for conceptualizing security policy-making of EU [19], ASEAN [20], and in some selected cases of Latin America [21]. It is also used as a broad approach to explain the security sector governance as the internal dimension of security policy making shift [22]-[24]. Some researchers even take it as a new *paradigm* for security capacity building [1].

The concern for security governance in theoretical discussions and practical issues is still accumulating. The utility of this new analytical perspective lies not only in explaining the current dynamics in theoretical and practical fields, but also in suggesting future research directions by discovering the advantages and disadvantages of this new framework and those previously established ones. The following section explains how security governance is applied by chinese civil protection (CP) and what the insufficiencies of this practical project imply for the future development of the framework of security governance.

III. AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO CHINESE CIVIL PROTECTION

The developmental process of Chinese CP, in many aspects, supports the security governance framework studied in this paper.

First, Chinese CP is developing to be an integrated emergency management system, embracing military department into its agenda. This is a great reflection of the trend to security governance which is characterized by multi-actor interaction and integration. The greatest change of this security policy and organizational shift within the CP structure involves the civil defense unit which has markedly transformed towards an increasing role in the national emergency management structure.

Civil defense originated from air defense. It was created in 1911 during the Italy-Spain War, when Italy became the first country in the world to cast a bomb from the air and subsequently expedited air detection, aiming at evacuating and protecting civilians from air bombing. From the First World War to the end of cold war, Civil Defense gained vast development in many parts of the world as the defense of war dominated the national security strategy. Civil defense developed in most parts of the world during the two world war time and expanded during the cold war era, designed primarily for the potential nuclear threat of US-Soviet nuclear war. Chinese civil defense also developed subsequently in this wave. Since the end of the Cold War, the responsibilities of Civil defense has transformed from air defense to a much comprehensive unit, including both wartime air defense and peacetime disaster prevention. Civil defense in many countries nowadays is currently an overall socialized system of disaster management and exerts an influencing role in the security system.

After the cold war ended, Civil defense started to transfer into a much broader structure, encompassing peacetime civil protection of natural and manmade disasters. After the incident of 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001, Civil defense began to embrace a task of anti-terrorist attack. In the international arena, the *international civil defense organization* is now a global unit organizing large scale civil protection during various natural and manmade emergent situations, such as humanitarian assistance in major disasters and greater concern for environmental protection. These fundamental changes both of organizational structure and function of Civil defense worldwide embody many aspects of security governance framework, rather than the previous perspective of security control or security management.

This integration of Chinese civil defense department into those horizontal agencies has been remarkable, since with a perspective of law it is not a legitimate unit for peace time emergency response, but traditionally has been viewed as a lawful prescription to execute air defense in the case of war and any kinds of external military invasion. Chinese ministry of civil affairs, national emergency office, national committee for disaster reduction, and state flood control and drought relief headquarters are some leading legitimate actors responsible for security action in emergent situations. Civil defense unit was, for a long period of time after the Second World War, separated from national emergency management system. On the other hand, the changing security context of the world requires that Civil defense unit should cooperate with other governmental departments when in emergency situations. As a matter of fact, the crucial dynamic behind Civil defense department transforming across most parts of China is driven by the current cross-state non-military security issues described above, such as large scale natural disaster, regional conflict, illegal immigration, global warming and economic crisis.

Additionally, Civil defense has advantages of resources for peacetime CP management, such as mobilization system of national defense, professional human resources, bomb shelter, and emergency materials reserves. In 2005 the fifth Civil defense conference (CDC) proposed a transformation that Civil defense shifted from exclusive air defense to an encompassing unit of air defense and disaster prevention. In 2006, the sixth CDC demanded that Civil defense make best use of its resources to strengthen peacetime disaster prevention and further develop its emergency response capacity. By this logic, what is happening in the field of Chinese emergency management is that Civil defense organizations are being merged into the overall national emergency management system, implying that they are reorganizing themselves in order to properly cooperate with their horizontal departments, such as bureau of earthquake, Civil affairs agency, Fire department, flood control department, and transportation department. One key development of Chinese civil defense across China is that it is reorienting its functions and transforming into one part of the national CP system. The fundamental tendency of Chinese civil defense is that it is moving into a comprehensive system constructed for providing security from military and non-military, natural and manmade threats.

This movement facilitates an open and interactive security structure within the government.

Generally, what Civil defense currently takes as its functions includes three aspects: air defense in case of external air bombing, disaster prevention and alleviation in case of peace time emergency, and resolution of daily crisis, which altogether constitute a much comprehensive security governance system. One project civil defense organization is doing is renaming its title from the original "air defense office" to "civil defense agency", for example, beijing air defense office is now retitled as beijing civil defense agency, and simultaneously changing its position from "separate department for air defense" to "an integral part of national emergency management system". The project of renaming on one hand is a good reflection of its employment for peace time civil protection, on the other hand it also reflects the trend of much more fragmentation of security function since the responsibility of civil protection is essentially redistributed within governmental departments. Therefore, the cooperation and collaboration between the civil defense unit and the horizontal actors are other issue of significance. civil defense department needs to keep a reliable connection with these parallel units such as ministry of civil affairs (where national committee for disaster reduction is established), Ministry of water resources (where state flood control and drought relief headquarters is set up), Fire department, and national earthquake relief headquarters. An interactive and cooperative relation between civil defense and the above agencies is expected to be formed.

Second, CP actors are attempting to interact with non-state actors which also play essential roles in security management. These actors mainly include NGOs, NPOs, private actors, associations and individuals. By implication, governance might imply such descriptive characteristics or qualities as transparency, cooperation, adaptability, deliberation, means for resolving conflicts, structures for consultation, rules of how authority and influence are distributed among actors, and mechanisms for enforcing rules and agreement. Therefore, as a feature of security governance, there is a tendency of decentralization of politics within administrate state and also an empowerment of state to non-state actors. A cooperative, transparent, interactive model between state and non-state actors is expected to be created and inefficient inter-organizational interaction would be always an obstacle to the emergency response operation.

Non-state actors are encouraged to participate into the education and training program designed by security management units. According to disaster sociology, *self protection* at the first moment when trapped in an emergent situation is critical to survive and alleviate suffering. Training and education on self protection sense and know-how is of great significance for citizens. It has been proved once again that the successful resolution of many disasters relies on the self protection know-how of those trapped people themselves before the first responders arrive. Self protection know-how is an integral part of disaster resilience. Therefore, it is of great importance for citizens who are vulnerable to emergencies and disasters to receive education and training on the sense and basic skills of self-protection.

One remarkable work in which civil protection actors engage is to invest large amounts of resources educating and training its staff and community citizens about disaster prevention and alleviation. Civil protection departments also build training and education schools, publish books on disaster prevention, and conduct drill practices. Education and training program for disaster prevention is now institutionalized as a regular work schedule of civil protection agencies in many parts of China. There are also evaluation systems to send feedbacks to them, informing them how to improve the civil protection performance. Social actors such as community members, volunteers, college students, and corporation staff are encouraged to participate in the training course and practice drills. In additional to the wide participation of social actors into the civil protection programs, what seems more critical is that there has been progressive involvement of out sourcing by non-state actors in security goods providing. Typical examples not only include the privatization of military-industrial complex [25] and security consultancy provided by private corporations. The increasing involvement of non-state actors in civil protection programs initiated by state is obviously another convincing aspect of the trend towards a security governance system.

Third, in the dimension of geographical scope, "geographical centralization" mentioned by Weber characterizes *security governance* in three directions: "downwards" to the micro local or cross provincial entities, "upwards" to macro regional or global levels, and "sideways" to horizontal not-state, non-profit and private actors. How Chinese CP "sideways" and interacts with the horizontal actors has been explained in the proceeding section. In terms of "downwards", Chinese CP system has witnessed the development of cross-provincial CP structure, integrating each of neighboring province's CP network into a comprehensive security unit through a combined single authority. This is realized by a CP "resource sharing network", which requires that each member province open its CP resource network (human resource, information, technology, working schedule, material) to each other and enables a shared CP resource network among the members. The "resource sharing network" has been proven to be successful in real time disaster prevention and instant rescue. Meanwhile in the aspect of "upwards", several developments can be obviously observed that lead Chinese CP to be more "internationalized". Following the quicker step of globalization and integration of information and capital, it has been revealed by the increasing willingness of Chinese CP to engage in multilateral cooperation in international CP to achieve joint objectives. The areas of cooperation mainly include international humanitarian assistance, UN peace keeping, global anti-terrorist, piracy combating, disaster rescue assistance and so on. This is largely due to the rising Chinese role in international arenas and the increasing Chinese influence in international affairs. This is done through regional security institutions set up between China and the international actors such as UN, regional organizations, and nation-states. In terms of climate change issue, China has drawn up a national climate plan and white paper for policies and actions for climate change, established a leading group on energy conservation and emission resolution [26]. Additionally, China is also a growing organizer of various international peacekeeping training courses and exchange activities, as well as a generous aid donor to peacekeeping and peace-building [27]. Overall, Chinese CP has been increasingly involved in

International CP in order to better deal with the cross-region and even global security issues.

IV. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION

This study concludes that Chinese CP is another form of practical application of security governance, and also, that security governance is not much of an alternative paradigm of security management.

The fact that Chinese CP is reorganizing structure, transforming responsibilities, strengthening inter-organizational cooperation reflects the basic demands and characteristics of *security governance*. Additionally, the transformation of CP towards an integrated emergency management system would be another empirical case to prove the greater feasibility of security governance perspective in explaining what is now happening in the fields of public administration and security management. In view of this, governance is naturally taken as synonymous with "good government" or "effective governing", and security governance is therefore deemed as an alternative *paradigm* for security capacity building [1].

Nevertheless, security governance is neither not all-embracing nor without problems. When krahmann [2] examined the shift from security government to security governance in Europe and North America, at least two problems were identified. The first problem was to question what role that "state" should play in the framework of security governance. Since the public goods-*public security*-could be provided by non-state actors, then we might be required to reconsider the underlying assumptions of the traditional security studies, which presume that the state and national security should remain at the core of security studies and the state should be the most reliable actor to ensure individual and societal security. Compared with the framework of security government, the authority of state and the administrative structure is much differentiated and fragmented under security governance. Nevertheless, what can be seen from Chinese CP experiences is that state actors remain the absolutely central role in inter-organizational interaction and in the overall security policy making. Non-governmental actors exert influence under the structure of state regulated system.

This might be further explained through the developmental state theory. This study has observed that overmuch emphasis on non-state function might weaken the role of state, which presumably needs to be strengthened for the developmental state in the process of modernization. One of the classical studies on state building is that of *Francis Fukuyama* [28], who stated that the underlying disorders such as frictions of modernization, inequalities of wealth, new security threats, weak international institutions, and rising unilateralism are indications of state failure, which originates from insufficient state capacity, and the key way out of state failure is to re-strengthen state building. By Fukuyama's state building perspective, the state needs to embrace good governance, which especially emphasizes state function rather than state responsibility. This is as a matter fact to return to the state role and state capacity. Jessop [29] has also stressed the importance of state capacity in the modernization of developmental states.

What needs additional attention is the proposition by some researchers that the heart of the notion of security governance is not to question the dominant position of the state, but to highlight the growing capabilities and willingness of participation of NGOs, private corporations, and individuals. This might not be completely grasped by many security studies within the traditional security framework. This statement, this paper would argue, is rather a weak complement for the security governance framework instead of asubstantial proof for it. Lynn put it frankly that "nowhere has government been reduced to a weak, largely subordinate, or merely facilitative one. Arguably, the trends are in the opposite direction"[30], the governments are reasserting their roles in the lives of individuals, businesses and state building.

The second question concerns the potential and practical absence of accountability for and cooperation with those non-state actors in the process of security governance, since function differentiation and geographical fragmentation of the involved actors would quite possibly impede the expected inter-sector cooperation and accountability. Therefore, "governance failure is not easily resolved"[2]. This study found similar and even more complicated problems in terms of security governance in Chinese CP project. First of all in Chinese CP, there is not clear distinction of responsibilities between Civil Defense and those of other horizontal departments. For example, what exactly Civil Defense and Earthquake Agency are responsible for during the different stages of earthquake response is still not clear. The second problem is that two command lines (order by department or order by locality) are intertwined with each other. There is no clear distribution of responsibility between the two actors in specific resolution of security issues, leaving instead obstacles for joint action and excuses for shirking responsibility when taking security actions in the real security practices. In a social protection system study on China's *wenchuan* earthquake in 2008 for example, hu *et al*. [31] observed that "the centralized but layered nature of the Chinese state creates complex issues of coordination and unclear chains of command". There are several reasons for the above problems. The foremost might be that there is no Civil Protection Law in China, and therefore no institutionalized procedure is well designed for launching the cooperative action of involved actors.

The shortcomings of Chinese CP imply that security governance is not an all-compassing framework capable of better dealing with those tricky problems that cannot be resolved within the framework of security government. This paper has found that the extent, to which security governance could reach its goal, largely depends on those regulations and orders designed by the security government structure. The latter provides the authority, order, and accountability system necessary for inter-organizational interaction, information management and pubic goods outsourcing. Security management structure remains fundamental in security practices.

The last but not the least important, from a pure theoretical point of view, security governance might also suffer logic skeptics as an alternative *paradigm*. If examined more strictly by Kuhn's notion of incommensurability in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* security governance is then proved to be out of the proposed "alternative paradigm". It is a well established idea that paradigms

between each other are "incommensurable". Kuhn [32] initially coined the term "incommensurability" to refer to conceptual, observational and methodological disparities between successive research paradigms that he had encountered in his searching of the development of the natural sciences. Later, he revised the notion arguing that incommensurability is due to differences in the neighboring contemporaneous sub-disciplines and taxonomic structures of successive scientific theories. By Kuhn's idea of incommensurability, this paper would argue that security governance is not much of an alternative paradigm of security government, since according to the analysis above the two perspectives hold the essential aspects in common. The fact that under security governance framework the bureaucracy is minimized and public policy is privatized does not mean that state function is condensed or state responsibility is diminished, but that the state is rearranging its relationships and redistributing pubic resources with non-state actors. State (or government), to Pierre and Peters, is not being replaced by societal entities, but providing direction to society [33]. This paper argues that during this process the role of state is not absolutely replaced by other actors or weakened by non-state's involvement in public issues, but is repositioned to a much more macro-level, enabling state to overally guide and regulate how societal entities behave. It is essentially important to distinguish between *state responsibility* and *state function*. While under the notion of security governance, state responsibility is withdrawing where marketization is needed; state function on the contrary, is enhancing as the state assumes wider range of responsibility for managing diverse fields and a variety of non-state actors. This paper therefore further argues that security governance framework is not essentially a substitute paradigm for the traditional security analysis framework. The vast development of security governance in "upwards", "downwards" and "sideways" is not to deny the state-centered security framework, but in many aspects to strengthen the state function in managing its relations with those non-state actors.

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Danzi Liao is currently a PhD candidate and research assistant at the Center for Non-traditional Security and Peaceful Development Studies, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China. She earned the Bachelor of History degree in 2005 at Jiangxi Normal University and Master Degree in 2007 in Management at Zhejiang University. She worked as a teacher in Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics from 2007-2009. She studies at American University (Washington D.C.) as a Visiting Scholar for 6 months from September 2010 to April 2011. She has published "A Research on Civil Defense System", in the edited book *Public Administration, Disaster Prevention and Crisis Management* (Social Sciences Academic Press, 2011).Her main areas of academic and research interest are disaster management and non-traditional security studies.