—The paper concerns the problem of event's identity under different descriptions. The point is that the whole dictionary of action-language would be inconsistent and ambiguous if we cannot prove that some of different descriptions are about identical events. One simply would not be in position to speak intelligibly on the topics of an action, agency, intention, and responsibility and so on. In this paper I consider the questions as follows. Is there actually only one thing happening when the event occurs, e. g. someone performs a bodily movement, say, pushing the switch to turn the light on? Or we can speak about principally different actions of a person? Can a person by making a bodily movement perform different action in the same time? Do intentional actions differ in their nature from unintentional events?
—Action, description, event, identity, intentionality, Wittgenstein.
Pavel M. Stepantsov is with the University of Russian Presidential Academy for National Economy and Public Administration, Russian Federation (e-mail: email@example.com).
Cite:Pavel M. Stepantsov, "The Significance of the Issue of Events‘ Identity under Different Descriptions for Social Theory and Social Philosophy," International Journal of Social Science and Humanity vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 259-262, 2013.